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LAURA CHAFEY

“Injustice Anywhere is a
Threat to Justice Everywhere”1
Internal vs. International Armed Conflicts:
Should the Distinction be Eliminated?
ABSTRACT:
This article discusses international humanitarian
law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols. It analyzes the rights of protected
persons under the Geneva Conventions, such as prisoners
of war and civilians, as well as the obligations of States
during armed conflicts. Furthermore, the article points out
the flaws in the Geneva Conventions, such as the
discrepancy between the obligations of States during an
international armed conflict vs. during an internal armed
conflicts.
It argues that this distinction between
international and internal armed conflicts should be

1

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, April
16, 1963, available at
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html
(Applying Dr. King’s quote referring to the civil rights issues in the
United States during the 1960s, to international humanitarian law issues
occurring in various countries in the world. The full quote reads:
“Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities
and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about
what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied
in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all
indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow,
provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United
States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its
bounds.”).

184

eliminated and that States’ obligations should be the same
for both conflicts.
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Introduction
The Geneva Conventions are international treaties
that govern the conduct of warfare, particularly the
treatment of the victims of war.1 These Conventions
distinguish international armed conflicts from noninternational armed conflicts, which is the cause of great
concern in the field of international humanitarian law.2 The
law that governs non-international armed conflicts,
Common Article 33 and Additional Protocol II,4 affords
significantly less protections for the victims of war and
1

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
2
See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV supra note 2.
3
Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116,
3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 34; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86, 88; Geneva Convention
III, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, 138;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 287 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
4
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, art. 4(2) (adopted June 8, 1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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fails to provide for any enforcement mechanisms.
However, victims of international armed conflicts receive
an array of protections, and if grave breaches of these
protections occur, states are obligated to prosecute such
violations.5
This distinction of internal and international armed
conflicts results in a discrepancy in protections and
prohibited acts, based on where the armed conflict occurs.
The resolution of such problem is to eliminate the
distinction and apply the laws of international armed
conflicts to all armed conflicts, regardless of where the
conflicts occur. One should not receive less protection
from the scourge of war, and one should not have impunity
from heinous war crimes, simply because of the borders
they are within. These injustices inherent in internal armed
conflicts are threats to justice and peace in the international
community. As such, internal conflicts should be treated as
international conflicts.
I. Background: International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law is simply the law of
war. Although in war there seems to be the absence of law
and only chaos, there are treaties7 and customary law8 that
6

5

Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 49, U.S.T. at 3146, 75
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art 50, 6 U.S.T. at
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art
129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 2, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
6
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1033 (6th ed.
2011).
7
For example the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects (CCW) or the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
188

govern the conduct of warfare. Even in ancient Greek
mythology there was a distinction between Ares, the god of
mere violence, and Athena, the Goddess of warfare, in
which warfare was understood “as an organized,
disciplined, rationally conducted collective activity.”9
Therefore, this idea that warfare should be restrained by
law is ancient.
The laws of war originate in the just war theory
developed by the great thinkers of our past, Saint Augustine
(354-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).10 The
just war theory distinguishes between the justice of war, jus
ad bellum, and the justice in war, jus in bello.11 Jus ad
bellum determines when resort to war is just and unjust.12
Historically, a just war required that the cause be just, that
war be the last resort, that it be authorized by a lawful
government, that the violence be proportional to the cause,
that the war be fought with rightful intention rather than a
mere pretext, and that the war carry a possibility of

Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) are examples of these types of
treaties. Convention on the Probation of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction, open for signature Dec. 3, 1977, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211;
Convention on Probations or Restrictions of the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or
to have Indiscriminate Effects, open for signature Apr. 10 1981, 1342
U.N.T.S. 137.
8
DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 1039 (2010) (stating that the four bedrock principles of
the rules of warfare are noncombatant immunity, proportionality,
necessity, and no unnecessary suffering).
9
STEVEN C. NEFF, WAR AND LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL
HISTORY 16 (2005).
10
GREGORY M. REICHBERG ET AL., THE ETHICS OF WAR: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (2006).
11
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1039.
12
Id.
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success.13 Since World War II, jus ad bellum is governed
by the United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 2(4), which
bans “the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.”14
However, there are exceptions to Article 2(4), which allow
war in cases of self-defense (Article 51) or when the UN
Security Council authorizes it, provided they find a threat
to or breach of international peace and security (Article
42).15
Jus in bello, on the other hand, determines whether
combatants are fighting justly or unjustly.16 There are four
main principles that govern jus in bello: The principle of
distinction, the principle of proportionality, the principle of
necessity, and the principle to avoid unnecessary
suffering.17 The principle of distinction, or noncombatant
immunity, distinguishes between civilians and combatants,
in that combatants may be directly attacked, whereas
civilians may not.18 However, civilians are only protected
against direct attack “unless and for such time as they take
direct part in hostilities.”19 In addition, combatants that
have surrendered or become hors de combat (outside of
combat), because of wounds or disease, are also protected
from direct attacks.20
It is inevitable that some civilians will become
collateral damage and be killed during war. However,
13

Id.
U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040.
15
Id. at arts. 42, 51.
16
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040.
17
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040-42.
18
Id. at 1041 (citing J.I. HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005)).
19
Id. (citing J.I. HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005)).
20
Id. at 1040.
14
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collateral damage is permitted provided it is unintentional
and is proportional to the military goals of such attack.21
This is known as the principle of proportionality.22 The
next principle is the principle of necessity, which states that
no violence is permitted unless militarily necessary, that is,
unless it contributes to overcoming the enemy.23 Lastly,
there is a principle to avoid any unnecessary suffering,
which states that no violence is permitted that would inflict
suffering for its own sake.24 The result of combatants
complying with these jus in bello principles is that they
receive belligerent privilege or immunity, and they will not
incur criminal liability for killing or injuring the enemy, or
even collateral damage, provided it was proportionate.25
Today, international humanitarian law is primarily
governed by “Hague law” and “Geneva law,” as well as
numerous treaties on specific subjects, such as prohibited
weapons.26 The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) has been essential in the creation and maintenance
of international humanitarian law. The ICRC was founded
in 1859, when a Swiss businessman, Henri Dunant, visited
a battlefield after the Battle of Solferino during the Second
War of Italian Independence.27 Appalled by the conditions
of the wounded and dying men abandoned on the field and
moaning in pain, Dunant founded the ICRC to aid and
assist the victims of war.28 In addition, the ICRC lobbied
states to negotiate treaties regulating the conduct of war.29
As a result, various states met at The Hague in 1899, and
21

Id. at 1041.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1041-42.
26
Id. at 1043
27
Id. at 1042.
28
Id.
29
Id.
22
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again in 1907, to adopt The Hague Conventions, which
codified the rules of war and most importantly, established
the principle that the right of combatants to injury the
enemy is not unlimited.30 These conventions are often
referred to as “Hague law.”31 In 1949, again with the help
of the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions were adopted to
further specify the rules of war.32 Since then, the ICRC has
become a major interpreter of international humanitarian
law and its commentaries on the Geneva Conventions have
“semi-official standing.”33 The Geneva Conventions were
a significant development in the field of international
humanitarian law.
II. The Geneva Conventions
After World War II, states met in Geneva,
Switzerland and adopted the four Geneva Conventions of
1949.34 These Conventions regulate the treatment of
“protected persons,” which are civilians and hors de
combat, such as prisoners of war or sick and wounded
combatants.35 The first Geneva Convention deals with
wounded and sick soldiers in the field, while the second
deals with the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea.36
The third deals with the treatment of prisoners of war
(POWs) and the fourth with the protection of civilians.37
30

Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1043.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Geneva Convention I, supra note 2; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 2.
36
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 2; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 2.
37
See Geneva Convention III, supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 2.
31
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The Geneva Conventions also distinguish between
international armed conflicts and armed conflicts not of an
international character, non-international or internal armed
conflicts.38 Article 3, common to all Geneva Conventions,
is the only provision that applies in non-international armed
conflicts, whereas the rest of the provisions apply to
international armed conflicts.39 In 1977, two additional
protocols were adopted to supplement the Geneva
Conventions and expand the protections of the victims of
war.40
These protocols also distinguished between
international and non-international armed conflicts –
Additional Protocol I only applied to international armed
conflicts while Additional Protocol II only applied to noninternational armed conflicts.41
Because the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions depends on the type of armed conflict, it is
important to note when an armed conflict is international
and when it is non-international. An “international” armed
conflict requires that two or more states be involved in the
armed conflict.42 In the reverse, a “non-international”
armed conflict is an armed conflict that is not between two
states, that is to say, an armed conflict within a state, such
as a civil war or insurgency.43 This distinction is
significant because there are far more protections for those
in international armed conflicts.

38

See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV supra note 2.
39
Common Article 3, supra note 4.
40
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1043.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1044 & n. 3.
43
Id. at 1060.
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A. “Grave Breaches”
The rules in the Geneva Conventions for
international armed conflicts are extensive and complex,
and therefore, our focus will only be on the violations that
amount to grave breaches. “Grave breaches” are the most
serious war crimes and core violations common to all four
Geneva Conventions.44 The grave breaches are, “any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property
protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health.”45 Geneva Conventions I, II, and IV also add
“extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly”46 to the list of grave breaches. Other grave
breaches include compelling prisoners of war (Geneva
Convention III) or protected persons (Geneva Convention
IV) to serve in the forces of a hostile power, and willfully
depriving prisoners of war (Geneva Convention III) or
protected persons (Geneva Convention IV) of their rights to
a fair and regular trial.47 Geneva Convention IV further
declares that unlawful deportation or confinement of a

44

Id. at 1047.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3196, 75
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art.
130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 2, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
46
Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3196, 75
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art.
147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
47
Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420,
75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 147, 6
U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
45
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protected person, and taking hostages are grave breaches as
well.48
Each state is required to criminalize grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions domestically, giving states
universal jurisdiction over these specific violations.49
States must “enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches.”50 In
addition, each state has an “obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts” or “hand such persons over for trial to another High
Contracting Party.”51 This concept is also known as the
“try or extradite” principle or aut dedere aut judicare.52
Furthermore, all Geneva Conventions provide that no state
party can be absolved of any liability incurred in regards to
these grave breaches, meaning that no amnesties may be
granted.53
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
not only expanded the protections applicable in
international armed conflict, but also expanded the list of
48

Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618,
75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
49
See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV supra note 2.
50
See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV supra note 2.
51
See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention
IV supra note 2.
52
CARTER, supra note 7, at 1120.
53
Id. at 1117.
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“grave breaches” that give rise to universal jurisdiction.54
For example, Additional Protocol I added to the list of
grave breaches prohibitions of acts, such as: making
protected persons the object of attack, perfidious use of the
red cross emblem, unjustifiable delay in repatriation of
protected persons, apartheid and other inhuman and
degrading practices involving outrages upon personal
dignity, attacks on historic monuments, works of art, or
places of worship.55 In addition, Additional Protocol I
states, “[a]ny willful act or omission which seriously
endangers the physical or mental health or integrity of any
person who is in the power of a Party other than the one on
which he depends…shall be a grave breach of this
Protocol.”56
While all provisions in the Geneva
Conventions apply to international armed conflicts, only
one article in the Geneva Conventions applies to noninternational armed conflicts; Article 3.57
B. Common Article 3
Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions,
is specifically concerned with armed conflicts not of an
international character, and is the only provision in the
Conventions related to such internal conflicts.58 Common
Article 3 provides:

54

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 41-42
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
55
Id.
56
Id. at art. 11, para. 4.
57
Common Article 3, supra note 4.
58
Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in
International humanitarian law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
189, 193 (2004).
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In the case of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed '
hors de combat ' by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria. To this end, the following
acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons: (a)
violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c)
outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular
humiliating
and
degrading treatment; (d) the
passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees
197

which
are
recognized
as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be
collected and cared for.
An
impartial humanitarian body, such
as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its
services to the Parties to the
conflict. The Parties to the conflict
should further endeavour to bring
into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other
provisions
of
the
present
Convention. The application of the
preceding provisions shall not
affect the legal status of the Parties
to the conflict.59
These protections are significantly less protective
than those protections given in an international armed
conflict. However, states attempted to fix this issue by
adopting Additional Protocol II in 1977.60
C. Additional Protocol II
Similar to Common Article 3, the Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions only applies to
armed conflicts of non-international character.61
Additional Protocol II was intended to supplement
Common Article 3 and advance the protections of persons

59

Common Article 3, supra note 4.
Cullen, supra note 59, at 199.
61
Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other
Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 25 (1983).
60
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taking no active part in hostilities.62 Additional Protocol II
includes all of the Common Article 3 protections and adds:
order that there shall be no survivors, violence to the health
and physical or mental well-being of persons, corporal
punishment, collective punishments, acts of terrorism, rape,
enforced prostitution, indecent assault, slavery, slave trade,
pillage, and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts, to
the list of prohibited acts towards protected persons.63
Children receive special protections in Protocol II,
whereas they did not in Common Article 3. Although
children may have fallen under Common Article 3
protections as persons taking no active part in hostilities,
Additional Protocol II extends protections specifically for
children and creates affirmative obligations regarding the
treatment of children.64 For example, children under the
age of fifteen years shall not be recruited in the armed
forces or groups, and should they take part in hostilities and
are captured, children under the age of fifteen are still
afforded special protection.65
Also, those facing
punishment of criminal offenses related to the armed
conflict under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense
shall not be given the death penalty.66 Additionally, there
are affirmative obligations to: provide children with care
and aid, facilitate the reunion of families temporarily
separated, and to remove children temporarily from areas
where hostilities are taking place to a safer area.67
Those, whose liberty has been restricted, such as
people interned or detained, also receive more protections
62

Id.
Additional Protocol II, supra note 5, at art. 4(2).
64
Id. at art. 4(3)(c)-(d).
65
Id.
66
Id. at art. 6(4).
67
Id. at art. 4(3)(b),(e).
63
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under Additional Protocol II.68 These protected persons
shall “be provided with food and drinking water and be
afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and
protection against the rigors of the climate and the dangers
of the armed conflict . . . allowed to practi[c]e their religion
. . . if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions
and safeguards . . . allowed to send and receive letters and
cards . . . have the benefit of medical examinations,” among
other protections.69 Additional Protocol II also expanded
upon the safeguards required during prosecutions and
punishment of criminal offenses related to the armed
conflict, and encourages authorities in power at the end of
hostilities to “grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”70
The most important advances of Additional
Protocol II are the specific protections for civilian
populations. Generally, civilian populations shall not be
the object of attack, and “[a]cts or threats of violence[,] the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
Starvation of
civilian population[,] are prohibited.”71
civilians as a weapon of war is prohibited. As such, it is
prohibited to “attack, destroy, remove or render useless for
that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas
for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”72
Attacks against “historic monuments, works of art or places
of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage
of peoples . . .” are prohibited.73 Displacement of civilian
68

Id. at art. 5(1)-(2).
Id.
70
Id. at art. 6.
71
Id. at art. 13(2).
72
Id. at art. 14.
73
Id. at art. 16.
69
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populations shall not be ordered, unless the civilians’
security is at risk or military necessity demands it, and in
such case, conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and
nutrition must be satisfactory.74
Additionally, the
protection and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked,
as well as medical and religious personnel, was also
extended in Additional Protocol II.75 Although Additional
Protocol II expanded protections afforded in noninternational conflicts, there are still many issues with
international humanitarian law in non-international armed
conflicts.
III. The Problem: International Humanitarian Law in
Non-international Armed Conflicts
The distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts in international humanitarian
law is a growing problem. Steven Solomon, the Principal
Legal Officer of the World Health Organization, agrees.
He says, “[s]imply put, conduct which was prohibited in
international warfare was not specifically prohibited in
internal warfare. There was, in a word, a gap in the law
and, consequently, a gap in the protections available for
those caught up in non-international armed conflicts.”76
One of the problems with international humanitarian law
for non-international armed conflicts is the difficulty of the
applying Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.77
Another problem is that protected persons, particularly
combatants that are captured, in non-international armed
74

Id. at art. 17.
Id. at arts. 7-12.
76
Steven Solomon, Internal Conflicts: Dilemmas and
Developments, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 579, 580 (2006).
77
Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of
Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL.
L. REV. 66, 67 (2005).
75
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conflicts receive fewer protections than those of
international armed conflicts.78 But the most significant
problem is the lack of enforcement mechanisms in
international humanitarian law for non-international armed
conflicts.79
A. The Applicability of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II
It is difficult to determine exactly when Common
Article 3 applies to a situation. Common Article 3 does not
set out any standards to determine when an internal armed
conflict is occurring and therefore there are no standards
determining its applicability. This is an issue because the
recognition of the existence of an armed conflict is then left
to the discretion of the state hosting the conflict.80
Therefore, the implementation of Common Article 3 is
based on the willingness of that state to recognize the
armed conflict. Should the state refuse to recognize the
armed conflict, it avoids application of Common Article
3.81 Thus, the problem is that “[i]ndividual states are . . .
left with a carte blanche to decide when . . . [C]ommon
Article 3 should be invoked.”82 States are unlikely to
recognize an armed conflict because it would limit the use
of repressive measures in which the state could employ to

78

Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying
International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 916, 933-36 (1994).
79
Lysaght, supra note 62, at 27.
80
Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 59, at 198.
81
Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed
Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, supra note 78, at 108.
82
Id. at 97.
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suppress such conflict.83 This results in Common Article 3
not applying in many situations in which it should.
Although Additional Protocol II has more
protections than Common Article 3, as previously
discussed, its application is much more limited than that of
Common Article 3.84 Additional Protocol II is limited to
armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties’ armed
forces and “dissent armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations.”85 There
is no language in Common Article 3 stipulating as to the
type of armed forces required for its application–it only
requires that there simply be an “armed conflict” within the
territory of a High Contracting Party.86 Furthermore,
Additional Protocol II “shall not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature.”87
In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined armed
conflict, with regard to internal armed conflicts, as
“protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State.”88 Therefore, there is a higher
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threshold to trigger the application of Additional Protocol II
than there is for Common Article 3. Not only must the
armed groups be “organized,” but they must be “under
responsible command” and “exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations.”89 Therefore, not all
cases of non-international armed conflicts will be covered
by Additional Protocol II. For example, Additional
Protocol II will “probably not operate in a civil war until
the rebels [are] well established and [have] set up some
form of de facto government.”90 In addition, only 166
countries are state parties to Additional Protocol II,
compared to the 194 state-parties to the Geneva
Conventions; therefore, the Additional Protocol II applies
in fewer states than the Geneva Conventions.91 The
inability to trigger the application of these instruments
leaves victims of non-international armed conflicts without
protection.
B. No Status for Combatants
Even when Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II are triggered, combatants in non-international
armed conflicts do not receive as much protections as
combatants in international armed conflicts.
Unlike
combatants in international armed conflicts, combatants in
non-international armed conflicts do not receive belligerent
privilege or immunity, nor do they receive prisoner of war
89
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(POW) status if captured.92 This refusal to recognize such
a status for combatants in internal armed conflicts is
exemplified by the provision in Common Article 3
declaring that it “shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict.”93 The ICRC, commenting on this
provision, confirms the lack of status for combatants of
non-international armed conflicts, stating that “the Article
does not give [the adverse party] any right to special
protection or any immunity, whatever it may be and
whatever title it may give itself or claim.”94 As you may
recall, belligerent privilege or immunity means that the
combatant may not be held criminally liable for killing or
injuring the enemy during an armed conflict, but can only
be held accountable for gross violations of international
humanitarian law.95 Without such belligerent immunity,
combatants in internal armed conflicts may be prosecuted
and punished for violating any national laws during the
conflict, unlike combatants in international armed
conflicts.96 Common Article 3 does not affect the legal or
political treatment that the combatant may receive as a
result of his behavior, that is, the article doesn’t affect the
state’s right to prosecute, try and sentence adverse
combatants for their crimes, according to its national
laws.97
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In addition to not receiving belligerent immunity,
combatants in non-international armed conflicts are not
extended POW status if captured during the conflict.98
Whereas all of the protections in the Geneva Convention III
regarding the treatment of POWs apply to captured
combatants of international armed conflicts, none of these
protections are afforded to combatants captured in internal
armed conflicts.99 For example, POWs must be detained
under special conditions and at the end of the conflict
POWs must be repatriated, whereas captured combatants in
non-international armed conflicts are not required to be
repatriated after the conflict.100
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court of the
United States discussed which Geneva Convention
protections applied to Hamdan, who was captured in 2001
during hostilities in Afghanistan.101 The Court found the
conflict to which Hamdan was involved to be “not of an
international character” because this particular incident
involved al Qaeda, a non-state actor, rather than the armed
forces of Afghanistan, which would have made the conflict
an international one.102 Thus, the Court found that
Common Article 3 applied to the situation. However, the
Court noted that the article provides less protection for
Hamdan than the rest of the Geneva Conventions, stating,
“Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal
protection, falling short of full protection under the
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a
signatory nor even a non-signatory who are involved in a
98
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conflict ‘in the territory of’ a signatory.’”103 The case
focused specifically on the judicial proceedings and
guarantees required by Common Article 3. Common
Article 3(1)(d) prohibits “the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”104 Although Common
Article 3 does not define the terms of this requirement, the
Court understood the requirement to mean “at least the
barest of those trial protections that have been recognized
by customary law.”105 The Court in the Hamdan case
continued, saying that, “Common Article 3 obviously
tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals
captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general
ones.”106 The Hamdan case exemplifies the lack of
protection, particularly judicial guarantees, provided to
captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts.
Captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts
are also at a higher risk of harsh treatment while detained.
Captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts
are protected from “violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture . . . outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” under
Common Article 3.107 However, POWs in an international
conflict are protected from “willful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health” under Article 130 and from “[a]ny unlawful act
or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or
103
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seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its
custody . . . physical mutilation or medical or scientific
experiments of any kind . . . acts of violence or intimidation
and against insults and public curiosity . . . [and] measures
of reprisal against prisoners of war” under Article 13 of the
Geneva Convention III, regarding the treatment of
POWs.108
POWs in international conflicts receive
extensive protections compared to combatants of noninternational conflicts. As such, even omissions that could
endanger the health of POWs and acts of intimidation are
violations of the Geneva Conventions.109 In addition, the
ICRC has permission to visit POWs in international
conflicts to ensure compliance, whereas in noninternational conflicts, the ICRC can merely offer its
services, which can be rejected by the host state.110
This lack of status for combatants in noninternational armed conflicts is an issue because these
combatants receive all the burdens of being a combatant
without any of the benefits of being a combatant. The
burden is that these combatants do not receive civilian
status and therefore may be directly targeted.111 But these
same combatants are still not given the benefit of POW
status and all the protections that follow such status if
captured.
Therefore, combatants in non-international
armed conflicts have no incentive to abide by the rules of
war; they are neither protected nor restrained.112
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C. Failure to Enforce
The most significant failure of Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II is that they lack an enforcement
clause. While the Geneva Conventions for international
armed conflicts require states to “enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions” and “bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts” or “hand such persons over for trial to another,”
neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II call
for such action in non-international armed conflicts.113
Thus, states are not required to prosecute war criminals in
non-international armed conflicts, like they are required to
in international armed conflict. In fact, there is not even an
article stating that parties shall ensure the observance of
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II.114 However,
all Geneva Conventions include an article that requires
state parties to “undertake to respect and to ensure respect
for the present Convention in all circumstances.”115
On the contrary, Common Article 3 states that it “shall not
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”116
ICRC commentary suggests that this provision means that
Common Article 3 “is in no way concerned with the
internal affairs of States” and “does not limit in any way
the Government’s right to suppress a rebellion using all the
means – including arms – provided for under its own
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laws.”117 The result is that, not only are violators going
unpunished, but also the parties are encouraged to engage
in measures that violate international humanitarian law,
thinking that they will not be held accountable.
The enforcement of Additional Protocol II is not
any better than that of Common Article 3. Additional
Protocol II not only promotes impunity with the lack of an
enforcement provisions, but also encourages granting
amnesty for criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.
Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II states that, “the
authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the
armed conflict.”118 However, a state party in international
armed conflicts is not allowed to absolve itself or any other
state of any liability incurred for grave breaches, such as
granting amnesty.119 Furthermore, Additional Protocol II
has an article dedicated specifically to the principle of nonintervention. Article 3 of Additional Protocol II declares:
(1) Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means,
to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State. (2) Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or
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external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the
territory of which that conflict occurs.120
Thus, Additional Protocol II cannot be used as a
pretext or justification to intervene in an internal armed
conflict.121 States are discouraged from prosecuting war
criminals in internal armed conflicts and are prohibited
from intervening to help the victims of internal armed
conflicts.
IV. Resolution: No Distinction
In 1977, during the Diplomatic Conference which
produced the Additional Protocols, Norway proposed that
there should no longer be a distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts.122 This
proposal was based on the idea that “victims in all
situations of armed conflict, whatever their nature, are
subject to the same suffering and should be helped in the
same way.”123 From 1990 to 2000, there were fifty-three
non-international conflicts and just three international
armed conflicts.124 There continues to be significantly
more non-international armed conflicts in the world than
there are international armed conflicts. So, today there are
more victims of war with less protection than when the
Geneva Conventions were created and when international
armed conflicts were more prevalent. This result cannot
possibly be the intent of international humanitarian law, or
the intent of the states when they gathered at Geneva in
1949. The way to resolve this issue, as the Norwegians
120

Common Article 3, supra note 4.
Id.
122
Solomon, supra note 77, at 581.
123
ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 1328 n. 31.
124
Solomon, supra note 77, at 579.
121

211

proposed, is to no longer distinguish non-international from
international armed conflicts.125 International humanitarian
law of international armed conflicts should then be applied
to all armed conflicts, regardless of where the conflict
occurs and by whom the conflict is fought.
How can the elimination of this distinction be
effectuated?
International law is created either by
international conventions or treaties and international
custom, a general practice accepted as law.126 It is highly
unlikely that states would agree to amend the Geneva
Conventions or adopt a new instrument that would
eliminate this distinction because such actions would
threaten their sovereignty.127 This is evidenced by the lack
of signatories (including the United States) to Additional
Protocol II, which sought to extend protections to victims
of internal armed conflicts.128 The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law defines customary international law
as resulting “from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”129 Although it is argued that Common Article
3 is considered customary international law, there is no
evidence that the rest of the provisions in the Geneva
Conventions–those applying to international conflicts–have
been applied to internal armed conflicts. In order for the
elimination of the distinction to become customary law,
states must apply international humanitarian law of
international conflicts to their internal conflicts in a
125
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consistent way, and do this in the belief that they are legally
obligated to.130 However, states have been reluctant to take
the steps necessary to effectuate the elimination of the
distinction by way of custom. For example, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the United States refused to give a combatant of
a non-international conflict any more protections than what
was required by Common Article 3.131 So we must ask, is
there a higher law that can govern this issue?
A. Saving All Victims from the Scourge of All Wars
The United Nations (UN) Charter declared that the
peoples of the UN are “determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war . . . and to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small.”132 Notice that in the UN
Charter–which is arguably the constitution of the world and
at the top of the hierarchy of international conventions–
there is no distinction between international wars or noninternational wars. Stated simply, the purpose of the UN is
to save people from “the scourge of war” in general,
implying all wars.133
The Charter goes on to reaffirm the “dignity and
worth of the human person,” that is to say all people.134
Additionally, the Charter notes the equality of “nations
large and small,” further eliminating a distinction based on
geography.135 If the ultimate goal of all states in the world
is to save all people from the scourge of all wars in all
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territories, why is there a difference in the protection of
these people depending on the type of war or where it is
fought? Logically, a distinction does not make sense.
Furthermore, Article 103 of the Charter states, “[i]n the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”136
Thus, the Charter trumps any treaty provisions inconsistent
with its purpose and principles, such as Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II, which claims there is a
distinction between the international and internal wars, and
the protections afforded in each.
B. Internal Conflicts are International Conflicts
Another way to eliminate the distinction between
international and internal armed conflict is through creative
interpretation.
The UN’s purpose is “[t]o maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”137
Under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council determines
when a threat to or breach of international peace and
security exists and then decides which measures to take,
whether it involves armed force (Article 42) or not (Article
41).138
Throughout history, the Security Council has
declared many internal conflicts as threats to and breaches
of international peace, and continues to do so. In 1993, the
Security Council, in response to the internal armed conflict
136
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occurring in Yugoslavia, adopted Resolutions 808 and 827,
both “[d]etermining that this situation constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.”139 A year later, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 955, declaring the
internal conflict in Rwanda as constituting a threat to
international peace and security.140 The Security Council
declared the internal conflict in Darfur, Sudan a threat to
international peace and security in multiple resolutions.141
And in 2011, the Security Council declared the internal
conflict in Libya as constituting a threat to international
peace and security through Resolution 1973.142
It is clear that internal conflicts can rise to the
degree constituting a threat to international peace and
security, calling for international measures to be taken.
Therefore, it be said that such internal conflicts become
international conflicts when they threaten or breach
international peace and security. By threatening the peace
and security of other states, internal conflicts become a
problem for other states, thus becoming an international
conflict. International humanitarian law of international
conflicts can then be applied to the situation.
From the time that the Geneva Conventions were
adopted in 1949 until the present, the world has become
more globalized and states have increasingly become more
interconnected and dependent upon each other. President
Mohammed Bedjaoui in the advisory opinion on the
139

S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C.
Res. 827, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
140
S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
141
See S.C. Res. 1556, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30,
2004); S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004);
S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (March 29, 2005); S.C.
Res. 1706, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); S.C. Res.
1769, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
142
S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011).
215

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
discusses this issue:
It scarcely needs to be said
that the face of contemporary
international
society
is
markedly altered . . . the
progress made in terms of the
institutionalization, not to say
integration
and
“globalization”,
of
international
society
is
undeniable. Witness the
proliferation of international
organizations, the gradual
substitution
of
an
international law of cooperation for the traditional
international law of coexistence, the emergence of
the concept of “international
community” . . . A token of
all these developments is the
place which international law
now accords to concepts such
as obligations erga omnes,
rules of jus cogens, or the
common
heritage
of
mankind. The resolutely
positivist,
voluntarist
approach of international law
still current at the beginning
of the century… has been
replaced by an objective
conception of international
law, a law more readily
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seeking to reflect a collective
juridical conscience and
respond
to
the social
necessities
of
States
organized as a community.143
So, a conflict in one state will inevitably affect other
states because of their interconnectedness, and possibly the
international community as a whole. Thus, an armed
conflict in one state is a conflict in other states, making
such a conflict an international one. Internal conflicts are
international conflicts, and should be treated as such.
C. All States Owe a Duty during Internal Armed
Conflicts
Some rules by their very nature are “the concern of
all states,” and thus, “all states can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection.”144 Such rules are referred to as
obligations erga omnes, and each state owes a duty to the
international community as a whole to fulfill such
obligations.145 Because all states owe a duty to the
international community with regard to these obligations
and all states have an interest their observance, matters
involving such obligations are no longer solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of the state in question.146
The ICRC, commenting on Geneva Convention IV
regarding the protection of civilians, stated that “the spirit
which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes it
143

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 270 (July 8).
144
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
145
Id.
146
Id.
217

desirable that they should be applicable ‘erga omnes.’”147
In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and its judgment in the Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), declared international
humanitarian law as having obligations erga omnes.148
Obligations erga omnes are so significant that Judge Bruno
Simma, in his separate opinion in the Case Concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, believed
that:
If
the
international
community allowed such
interest to erode in the face
not only of violations of
obligations erga omnes but of
outright attempts to do away
with
these
fundamental
duties, and in their place to
open black holes in the law in
which human beings may be
“disappeared” and deprived
of any legal protection
whatsoever for indefinite
periods of time,
then
international law, for me,
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would become much less
worthwhile.149
Therefore, the obligations delegated by international
humanitarian law are so important that they concern all
states, all states have an interest in them, and all states owe
such obligations to all other states. For such fundamental
obligations, it seems strange that such obligations would
vary depending on the type of circumstances involved, in
this case the type of armed conflict involved. Furthermore,
if the protection of civilians during war and the special
treatment of POWs are so essential as to be the concern of
all states, the lack of such protection or special treatment in
non-international conflicts would seem to defeat the
purpose of making them erga omnes obligations. In order
to properly fulfill the obligations erga omnes of
international humanitarian law, the rules governing
international armed conflicts must be applied to all armed
conflicts, including non-international armed conflicts.
Conclusion
By their nature, the protections afforded to victims
of war and the prohibited acts in warfare are of
international concern and interest. Thus, the absence of
these protections and the occurrence of such prohibited acts
in internal armed conflicts, create a conflict for the
international community as a whole. As such, internal
armed conflicts should be treated like international armed
conflict, in which all provisions of the Geneva Conventions
apply.
There should be no distinction between
international and internal armed conflicts when it comes to
the application of international humanitarian law. War is
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horrific no matter where it occurs and victims of internal
armed conflicts suffer as much as victims of international
armed conflicts. The outdated notion that victims of war
should receive less protection, and that perpetrators of war
crimes should go free, merely because the armed conflict
was internal to one state, is an injustice to that state and
those victims. Such injustice is a threat to all states and to
the stability of the international community, and therefore
should no longer be tolerated.
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